

THE SMART INTRAOCULAR LENS PARADOX: A CRITICAL REASSESSMENT OF MARKETING BENEFITS, UNDERREPORTED ADVERSE EFFECTS, AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF CATARACT SURGERY

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Abstract

Purpose: To critically examine the evidence base underlying smart intraocular lens (IOL) marketing claims, quantify the magnitude of underreported adverse effects, evaluate the role of commercial incentives in shaping clinical adoption, and argue that the designation “smart” constitutes a marketing construct rather than a meaningful clinical distinction.

Methods: A critical narrative review was conducted synthesizing evidence from independent (non-manufacturer-sponsored) clinical outcome studies, systematic reviews, explantation registries, patient-reported outcome data, medicolegal case analyses, regulatory documentation, and financial disclosures in the smart IOL literature. Satisfaction and adverse event data were disaggregated by sponsorship sources to evaluate reporting bias.

Results: Manufacturer-sponsored trials report satisfaction rates exceeding 90–98%, while independent tertiary referral studies document dissatisfaction in up to 94.7% of referred patients, with persistent photic phenomena (halos, glare, starbursts, diplopia) affecting 43–95% of recipients depending on assessment methodology. The Cochrane systematic review confirms significantly elevated risks of glare (RR 1.41) and halos (RR 3.58) relative to monofocal IOLs. Explantation rates among dissatisfied patients range from 0.85% to 7%, with neuroadaptation failure; an inherent consequence of simultaneous vision optics, identified as a leading cause. Financial analysis reveals that smart IOLs generate per-procedure revenue increases of 200–500% over standard monofocal implantation, creating structural incentives that compromise objective patient counseling. Critically, the evidence base upon which smart IOLs were approved systematically excludes the patients most likely to experience complications, inflating apparent efficacy while masking real-world failure rates.

Conclusions: The smart IOL industry operates on a business model that conflates technological sophistication with clinical superiority. The evidence does not support the claim that smart IOLs represent a categorically better option for the majority of cataract patients. A substantial and inadequately disclosed minority of recipients experience degraded visual quality, persistent dysphotopsia, and neuroadaptation failure; outcomes that would not have occurred with monofocal implantation. The “smart” designation functions primarily as a pricing and marketing mechanism rather than a reliable indicator of superior patient outcomes.

Keywords: smart intraocular lens; multifocal IOL; adverse effects; patient dissatisfaction; explantation; marketing; neuroadaptation failure; contrast sensitivity; dysphotopsia; commercial bias

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1. Introduction

The transformation of cataract surgery from a sight-restoring procedure into a consumer-driven refractive enterprise represents one of the most commercially consequential shifts in modern ophthalmology. Central to this transformation is the “smart” intraocular lens (excluding toric monofocal lens); a category defined not by regulatory distinction but by its pricing model, in which patients pay out-of-pocket surcharges ranging from \$1,500 to \$4,000 per eye above standard monofocal implantation. The global smart IOL market reached approximately USD 4.5–4.7 billion in 2024 (Grand View Research, 2024; Mordor Intelligence, 2024), with smart IOL adoption rates reaching 15–37% depending on region (Market Scope, 2025); a figure driven less by clinical superiority than by effective marketing, patient aspiration, and physician financial incentives. Compounding this problem is the increasing use of the term “smart lenses” or “smart IOLs”; a marketing misnomer designed to seduce patients and naïve eye doctors alike into believing these devices offer intelligent, self-adjusting optical performance, when in reality they remain passive optical elements with fixed physical properties.

The narrative surrounding smart IOLs is one of unqualified progress: manufacturer-sponsored trials routinely report satisfaction rates exceeding 90%, and the majority of patients indicate they would choose the same lens again (Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 2019; Alió et al., 2017). This narrative, however, is constructed upon a foundation of systematic selection bias, industry-sponsored outcome data, and the exclusion of precisely those patients whose outcomes would complicate the marketing story. When independent investigators examine patients referred specifically for dissatisfaction, as de Vries and Nuijts (2013) and Woodward et al. (2009) have done, the picture changes dramatically: de Vries and Nuijts (2013), in a systematic literature review of dissatisfied patients referred to tertiary centers, found that up to 94.7% presented with blurred vision, and 38–42% reported photic phenomena that persisted despite technically successful surgery.

This paper challenges the prevailing consensus that smart IOLs represent a straightforward advance in patient care. We argue instead that: (1) the adverse effect profile of smart IOLs is systematically underreported in the literature that informs clinical decision-making; (2) the designation “smart” serves primarily as a marketing and pricing construct that does not reliably correlate with superior clinical outcomes; (3) the commercial structure of smart IOL surgery creates incentive misalignment between physician financial interest and patient welfare; and (4) for a substantial minority of patients, smart IOLs deliver objectively worse visual quality than the monofocal alternatives they replace. Our purpose is not to deny that some patients benefit from smart IOLs, but to argue that the industry’s presentation of these devices is misleading, the

adverse effect profile is inadequately disclosed, and the patient consent process is compromised by commercial pressure. Importantly, this critique does not extend to toric IOLs designed to correct significant astigmatism, which have a sound clinical indication, deliver reliable refractive results; although often classified under the “smart” umbrella, they are not typically marketed as “smart” lenses. Our criticism is directed specifically at IOLs marketed as enabling complete spectacle independence at all distances and under all conditions.

1.1 Review Approach

This paper employs a critical narrative review methodology. Evidence was identified through targeted searches of PubMed, Cochrane Library, and Google Scholar using the terms “multifocal intraocular lens,” “smart IOL,” “EDOF IOL,” “IOL explantation,” “neuroadaptation,” “dysphotopsia,” and “cataract surgery outcomes,” supplemented by citation tracking from the Cochrane systematic review (de Silva et al., 2016) and key explantation case series. Inclusion criteria were: peer-reviewed clinical studies or systematic reviews reporting outcomes after multifocal or EDOF IOL implantation; case series of IOL explantation with documented indications; regulatory documents and professional society consensus statements directly relevant to smart IOL indications; and market or medicolegal data bearing on the commercial architecture of smart IOL practice. Exclusion criteria were: studies reporting outcomes exclusively for toric monofocal IOLs; editorials or opinion pieces without primary data; and manufacturer-sponsored data used in isolation without independent corroboration (manufacturer-sponsored data were included for comparison purposes, not as primary evidence of efficacy). Priority was given to independent (non-manufacturer-sponsored) clinical outcome studies, systematic reviews, explantation registries, medicolegal case analyses, and regulatory documentation. Satisfaction and adverse event data were systematically disaggregated by funding source; sponsored versus independent, to evaluate the sponsorship effect on reported outcomes. A narrative rather than systematic review design was selected because the primary research question is evaluative (“Does the cumulative evidence support the marketing claims of the smart IOL industry?”) rather than quantitative (“What is the pooled efficacy?”); meta-analytic aggregation of studies with fundamentally different populations and outcome measures would obscure the funding-source heterogeneity that is central to the paper’s thesis.

2. The Evidence Asymmetry: Sponsored vs. Independent Outcome Data

2.1 The Sponsorship Effect on Reported Outcomes

The evidence base for smart IOLs is dominated by manufacturer-sponsored studies that employ strict inclusion criteria, short follow-up periods, and outcome measures selected to favor the device under study. A meta-analysis of peer-reviewed publications involving 8,797 eyes reported mean spectacle independence of 80.1% (Alió et al., 2017), a figure frequently cited in marketing materials. However, this figure aggregates studies with widely varying methodology, follow-up duration, and definitions of “spectacle independence,” and is weighted toward manufacturer-funded research with favorable designs.

The Cochrane systematic review (de Silva et al., 2016), arguably the most methodologically rigorous evaluation of multifocal versus monofocal IOLs, reaches a more nuanced conclusion.

While multifocal recipients achieved better near vision, they experienced significantly more glare (RR 1.41, 95% CI 1.03–1.93) and substantially more halos (RR 3.58, 95% CI 1.99–6.46) compared to monofocal recipients. These are not rare complications; they represent a near-universal degradation of optical quality that multifocal optics impose by design. The simultaneous presentation of multiple focal planes to the retina; the fundamental operating principle of these devices, mathematically guarantees a reduction in contrast sensitivity and an increase in stray light artifacts. Taken together, the sponsored trial literature and the independent tertiary-referral data define the upper and lower bounds of the true population-level adverse event prevalence: the real-world rate of clinically significant dissatisfaction in an unselected cataract population receiving smart IOLs lies between the approximately 2–10% implied by sponsored trials (where “satisfaction” is defined broadly and follow-up is short) and the 32–55% documented among referred patients (who represent a self-selected dissatisfied minority). Calibrating between these two poles, a conservative but defensible estimate is that 10–20% of smart IOL recipients in routine clinical practice experience a level of visual dissatisfaction that meaningfully affects quality of life; a figure that is not disclosed to patients at the point of consent.

2.2 What Tertiary Referral Centers Reveal

The disconnect between marketed outcomes and clinical reality becomes starkest at tertiary referral centers that receive patients specifically because they are dissatisfied. Woodward et al. (2009), in a series from the Emory Eye Center, found that 32 patients (43 eyes) presented with unwanted visual symptoms after multifocal IOL implantation. Among these, 65% reported blurred vision and 35% reported photic phenomena, with 37% reporting both. Causes included ametropia (29%), dry eye (15%), posterior capsule opacification (54%), and critically 2% with unexplained etiology. Even after treatment intervention, 23% of patients were only partially satisfied and 32% remained completely dissatisfied. These figures, a combined 55% treatment failure rate among referred patients, are absent from the marketing materials that patients encounter when choosing between IOL options.

Kamiya et al. (2014), in a case series of 50 explanted multifocal IOL eyes, documented the spectrum of complaints driving surgical reversal: waxy vision (58%), glare and halos (30%), blurred distance vision (24%), dysphotopsia (20%), and blurred near vision (18%). The leading objective causes for explantation were decreased contrast sensitivity (36%), photic phenomena (34%), neuroadaptation failure of unknown origin (32%), and incorrect lens power (20%). These data reveal that the most common reason for smart IOL failure; contrast sensitivity loss, is not a surgical error or a patient selection failure but an inherent optical property of multifocal design.

Figure 1 shows the smart IOL outcomes: the reporting asymmetry, while Table 1 shows the smart IOL outcome reporting: manufacturer-sponsored vs. independent data.




Figure 1. Smart IOL Outcomes: The Reporting Asymmetry, comparing manufacturer-sponsored trial data with independent tertiary referral center findings across five key outcome metrics, illustrating the systematic divergence between marketed and real-world results.

Table 1. Smart IOL Outcome Reporting: Manufacturer-Sponsored vs. Independent Data.

Metric	Manufacturer-Sponsored Data	Independent / Tertiary Data
Overall satisfaction	90–98%	45–68% (after intervention in referred patients)
Spectacle independence	80–100%	Variable; 20% report needing glasses for key tasks
Halos reported	43% (rated “not bothersome”)	RR 3.58 vs. monofocal (Cochrane review)
Glare reported	14%	RR 1.41 vs. monofocal (Cochrane review)
Contrast sensitivity	Rarely quantified	Measurably reduced; leading cause of explantation (36%)
Explantation rate	<1% (overall)	0.85–7% among dissatisfied; 5.7% vs. 0% monofocal in RCT
Follow-up duration	Typically 3–6 months	Neuroadaptation failure emerges >12 months

3. The Optical Penalty: What “Smart” Optics Actually Deliver

3.1 The Inherent Contrast Sensitivity Tax

The fundamental physics of multifocal IOL optics imposes an unavoidable trade-off that marketing materials consistently minimize: the splitting of incoming light across multiple focal points necessarily reduces the energy available at any single focus. In a trifocal IOL, incoming light is distributed across distance, intermediate, and near foci, with additional energy lost to

higher diffraction orders. The net effect is that no single focal plane receives the full intensity of light that a monofocal IOL delivers to its single focus. This is not a design flaw amenable to engineering improvement; it is a physical constraint inherent to the principle of simultaneous vision. It should be noted that EDOF lenses operate on different optical principles; primarily elongating the depth of focus through aberration control, diffractive steps, or pinhole optics rather than creating discrete simultaneous focal planes, and their contrast sensitivity penalty and dysphotopsia rates, while generally lower than those of diffractive trifocals, are not negligible; the critique of the optical penalty in this section applies most directly to diffractive multifocal designs. See figure 2.




Figure 2. The Optical Penalty: Light energy distribution in monofocal versus trifocal IOL designs. A monofocal IOL directs 100% of incident light to a single focal plane, while a trifocal IOL distributes approximately 40% to distance, 25% to intermediate, and 22% to near, with ~13% lost to higher diffraction orders.

The clinical consequence is a measurable and consistent reduction in contrast sensitivity across all lighting conditions. While marketing materials emphasize that this reduction is “clinically insignificant,” patients experience it as a loss of visual crispness, a waxy or hazy quality to their vision, and difficulty distinguishing objects in dim lighting. Kamiya et al. (2014) identified decreased contrast sensitivity as the single most common objective reason for multifocal IOL explantation (36% of cases); more common than photic phenomena (34%) or incorrect lens power (20%). When the leading cause of surgical failure is an inherent optical property of the device rather than a correctable error, the device concept itself warrants scrutiny.

3.2 Dysphotopsia: The Permanent Companion

Halos, glare, starbursts, and diplopia are not complications of multifocal IOL surgery in the conventional sense; they are predictable optical consequences of diffractive and refractive light-splitting. Every multifocal IOL produces defocused light at non-target focal planes, and this defocused light manifests as halos around point sources, glare from bright objects, and starburst patterns in scotopic conditions. The Cochrane review’s finding of a 3.58-fold increase in halo prevalence relative to monofocal IOLs (de Silva et al., 2016) is not evidence of poor surgical

technique; it is evidence of normal device function.

The industry’s response to these data has been to reframe dysphotopsia as a transient phenomenon amenable to “neuroadaptation.” This framing serves a marketing purpose by implying that the brain will eventually filter out the unwanted optical artifacts. While some degree of perceptual adaptation does occur in many patients, the neuroadaptation narrative is deployed with insufficient acknowledgment of its failures. When neuroadaptation fails; it does, in a clinically significant minority, patients are left with permanently degraded visual quality and the choice between living with symptoms or undergoing IOL exchange surgery, itself a procedure carrying meaningful risk of complications including posterior capsule rupture, corneal endothelial damage, and cystoid macular edema (Jin et al., 2005; Galor et al., 2009). See figure 3.




Figure 3. Forest-style plot of relative risk for adverse outcomes in multifocal versus monofocal IOL recipients, based on Cochrane systematic review data (de Silva et al., 2016) and randomized controlled trial explantation rates. All relative risks exceed 1.0, indicating elevated risk with multifocal implantation.

4. Neuroadaptation Failure: The Unacknowledged Complication

Neuroadaptation; the brain’s capacity to adjust to the novel optical input of a multifocal IOL (Alió and Pikkell, 2019), is presented in the smart IOL literature as a reliable process requiring only patience. The standard clinical guidance is to wait 6–12 months before concluding that adaptation has failed. During this prolonged adjustment period, patients experiencing significant visual symptoms are counseled to “give it time”; advice that serves the surgeon’s interest in avoiding early reoperation but may not serve the patient’s interest in quality of life. Fernández-Buenaga et al. (2012) reported in a national study on causes of IOL explantation in Spain that neuroadaptation failure was the main cause of explantation in patients with multifocal IOLs (as cited in Al-Shymali et al., 2022a). This finding is particularly significant because it means that the most common reason for smart IOL surgical failure is not a technical error; not a

wrong power calculation, not a decentered lens, not a comorbid condition, but a fundamental incompatibility between the device’s optical demands and the patient’s neural processing capacity. No amount of surgical refinement, improved biometry, or better lens design can resolve a failure that originates in the cortex rather than the cornea. Even proponents of multifocal IOLs acknowledge the problem: Müftüoğlu (2023) noted that the rate of IOL exchange due to neuroadaptation failure is less than 1%, yet conceded that 23% of patients who do undergo exchange remain dissatisfied with the result; underscoring that the damage, once done, is difficult to reverse.

Al-Shymali et al. (2022a) evaluated outcomes after multifocal-to-monofocal IOL exchange in 13 patients (26 eyes) with neuroadaptation failure. While corrected distance visual acuity improved modestly (from 20/26 to 20/23), uncorrected near visual acuity worsened significantly (from 20/47 to 20/62), and -most tellingly- 77% of patients stated they would not repeat the lens exchange if given the choice again. This finding reveals the irreversible nature of the smart IOL cascade: the patient who fails to neuroadapt faces a choice between two suboptimal outcomes, neither of which would have been necessary had a monofocal IOL been implanted initially. A parallel study by the same group examined an alternative strategy: exchanging the original multifocal IOL for a different multifocal design (Al-Shymali et al., 2022b). While 80% of those patients reported they would undergo the re-exchange again, the necessity for a second intraocular surgery to salvage a “smart” outcome reinforces the argument that the initial risk was inadequately communicated. See figure 4.




Figure 4. Reasons for multifocal IOL explantation in a case series of 50 eyes (Kamiya et al., 2014). The three most common causes; decreased contrast sensitivity, photic phenomena, and neuroadaptation failure, are inherent consequences of multifocal optical design rather than correctable surgical errors.

5. The Commercial Architecture of “Smart” Designation

5.1 Financial Incentives and Physician Behavior

The term “smart” is not a regulatory classification. The U.S. FDA does not distinguish between “smart” and “standard” IOLs as separate device categories; multifocal, EDOF, toric, and monofocal IOLs are all approved under the same premarket approval pathway. The “smart” designation is a commercial construct that enables a patient-pay surcharge, typically \$1,500–\$4,000 per eye, above the insurance-covered cost of standard monofocal implantation. This surcharge transforms cataract surgery from a fully insured medical procedure into a partially elective consumer purchase; a transformation with profound implications for the physician-patient relationship.

Cataract surgeons who offer smart IOLs operate within a financial structure that rewards upselling. The per-procedure revenue increase for smart implantation is substantial, and practices that achieve higher smart adoption rates generate significantly greater revenue per surgical hour. Industry data show that only 10–20% of cataract surgeons actively offer smart IOLs despite 30–60% of patients expressing interest (Carones et al., 2014); a gap that the industry frames as an adoption barrier to be overcome through surgeon education and practice management consulting. The implicit message is clear: surgeons who do not offer smart IOLs are leaving revenue on the table.

This financial structure creates an incentive misalignment that is rarely acknowledged in clinical literature. The surgeon who recommends a smart IOL is simultaneously the clinician advising the patient and the business operator who benefits financially from the patient’s choice. While most surgeons navigate this dual role conscientiously, the structural incentive to recommend more expensive options; to minimize the disclosure of adverse effects that might deter patient acceptance, is undeniable. The smart IOL literature is replete with “practice management” guidance on how to “convert” standard cataract patients to smart candidates, how to structure the counseling conversation to maximize upgrade rates, and how to overcome patient “objections”; language borrowed directly from sales methodology.

5.2 The Conflict of Interest in Smart IOL Research

A systematic examination of the smart IOL clinical literature reveals pervasive financial entanglement between researchers and device manufacturers. The most cited investigators in the multifocal IOL field frequently disclose consulting relationships, research grants, and equity positions with IOL manufacturers; relationships that do not invalidate their findings but create a structural bias toward favorable reporting. Manufacturer-sponsored clinical trials employ strict inclusion criteria that exclude patients with ocular comorbidities, irregular corneal surfaces, macular pathology, and -importantly- patients with personality profiles associated with lower tolerance for optical compromise. The resulting study populations are optimized for favorable outcomes and bear limited resemblance to the general cataract population that encounters smart IOL marketing in the real world. Table 2 shows the smart IOL revenue model: per-eye financial comparison.

Table 2. The Smart IOL Revenue Model: Per-Eye Financial Comparison.

Component	Standard Monofocal	Smart Multifocal/EDOF
Insurance reimbursement	~\$800–\$1,200	~\$800–\$1,200
Patient out-of-pocket surcharge	\$0	\$1,500–\$4,000
IOL device cost to practice	~\$100–\$200	~\$300–\$800
Net revenue increase per eye	Baseline	+\$1,000–\$3,500 (200–500% increase)
Additional chair time required	Baseline	15–30 min (counseling, enhanced consent)

6. The Informed Consent Deficit

The informed consent process for smart IOL implantation is compromised by several structural features that systematically bias patient decision-making toward smart selection. First, the counseling conversation typically occurs in a clinical setting where the surgeon or a trained “smart IOL coordinator” presents the options using materials developed in collaboration with device manufacturer, materials designed to maximize conversion rather than to provide balanced clinical education. Notably, the ASCRS Task Force consensus on multifocal IOL indications and contraindications (Braga-Mele et al., 2014) provides clinical guidance that is rarely incorporated into these patient-facing materials. Second, the framing of the choice as “standard” versus “smart” implies that the monofocal option is inferior, when in fact monofocal IOLs deliver superior optical quality (higher contrast sensitivity, lower dysphotopsia) at a single focal distance; a trade-off that many patients might prefer if it were presented neutrally.

Third, the disclosure of adverse effects is typically couched in probabilistic language (“a small percentage of patients may experience...”) that understates the certainty with which multifocal optics produce contrast reduction and the near-universality of some degree of dysphotopsia. Fourth, the “neuroadaptation” narrative is invoked preoperatively to preemptively normalize early dissatisfaction and discourage patients from requesting lens exchange during the period when the procedure would be technically simplest.

The medicolegal data reinforces this analysis. The Ophthalmic Mutual Insurance Company (OMIC, 2021) reported a “noticeable uptick in complaints and lawsuits related to implantation of smart IOLs,” with an average cataract surgery settlement of \$192,865 and settlements ranging up to \$1,000,000. Among the principal drivers of litigation, OMIC identified unrealistic expectations, IOL selection errors, and failure to detect pre-existing conditions; all of which reflect, in varying degrees, a consent process that prioritizes enthusiasm over accuracy.

7. The Real-World Impact on Patients: Case Patterns from Clinical Practice

The published literature, constrained by selection bias and reporting norms, fails to capture the lived experience of smart IOL dissatisfaction. Clinical practice reveals recurring patterns that merit documentation. Ophthalmic surgeons working in tertiary referral settings consistently report receiving patients who describe their smart IOL vision as “waxy,” “filmy,” or “like looking through a dirty window”; descriptions that correspond to measurable contrast sensitivity loss but that do not map onto any category in the standard postoperative assessment protocol. These patients have technically excellent surgical outcomes: well-centered IOLs, plano

refraction, clear media, and 20/20 or better Snellen acuity. Their dissatisfaction is invisible to conventional metrics because those metrics were not designed to capture the quality-of-vision degradation that multifocal optics inherently produce. Critically, the adverse outcomes observed after “smart lens” or smart IOL implantation are predominantly attributable to two factors: (A) poor preoperative assessment; failure to adequately screen for ocular comorbidities, binocular vision anomalies, corneal irregularities, and patient personality profiles incompatible with multifocal optics; and (B) overlooked incompatibilities between the specific IOL’s physical and optical properties and the individual patient’s ocular anatomy and visual demands. When either or both of these factors are present, the likelihood of post-implantation dissatisfaction rises sharply.

Faschinger (2020) documented a particularly instructive case: a 56-year-old woman with childhood hypermetropic anisometropia and strabismus who received bilateral toric trifocal IOLs. Despite achieving 20/20 and 20/30 acuity, the patient developed intractable halos, glare, waxy vision, and diplopia, requiring bilateral explantation at five and seven months with replacement by monofocal toric IOLs. The manufacturer’s own Instructions for Use had listed amblyopia as a “severe contraindication” for the implanted lens. This case illustrates a recurring theme: the smart IOL industry creates devices with known contraindications, fails to provide the clinical infrastructure for screening, and then attributes failures to “inadequate patient selection” rather than to fundamental limitations of the technology.

By way of illustrative clinical experience (offered here as contextual observation, not as systematically gathered data), senior ophthalmic surgeons in active practice report observing no fewer than four cases per year of critical failure patterns involving smart IOLs; cases in which the adverse effects on the patient’s eyes and visual quality were severe enough to require surgical intervention or to leave the patient functionally worse than their pre-surgical baseline. When extrapolated across the thousands of smart IOL centers operating worldwide, these individual practice observations suggest a population-level problem of considerable magnitude. Table 3 shows the recurring patterns of smart IOL failure in clinical practice.

Table 3. Recurring Patterns of Smart IOL Failure in Clinical Practice.

Pattern	Clinical Manifestation	Underlying Cause
Contrast sensitivity loss	Waxy or filmy vision; difficulty in dim light; reduced ability to distinguish objects	Inherent light-splitting of multifocal optics; reduced energy per focal plane
Persistent dysphotopsia	Halos, glare, starbursts around point light sources; night driving difficulty	Defocused light from non-target focal planes; diffractive ring interference patterns
Neuroadaptation failure	Persistent visual dissatisfaction >12 months despite excellent acuity; reduced quality of life	Insufficient cortical plasticity to suppress defocused overlays; may be exacerbated by age
Undetected binocular anomaly	Intractable diplopia, fixation switch, decompensated strabismus after IOL implantation	Unscreened amblyopia, monofixation, or suppression incompatible with simultaneous vision
Explantation cascade	Initial dissatisfaction → exchange surgery → further complications → ongoing dissatisfaction	Exchange surgery risks endothelial damage, CME, posterior capsule compromise; 77% would not repeat

8. Deconstructing the “Smart” Construct: What the Label Actually Means

The word “smart,” when applied to intraocular lenses, implies superiority; a better product that justifies a higher price. But smart in what dimension? Not in distance visual acuity, where monofocal IOLs deliver equivalent or superior results. Not in contrast sensitivity, where monofocal IOLs are categorically superior. Not in the absence of dysphotopsia, where monofocal IOLs produce significantly fewer halos, glare, and starbursts. The sole dimension in which smart IOLs genuinely outperform monofocal alternatives is spectacle independence for intermediate and near tasks; a convenience benefit that comes at the cost of degraded optical quality across all focal distances.

The framing of spectacle independence as a “smart” outcome reveals the commercial logic underlying the entire category. Reading glasses are inexpensive, universally available, and impose no risk. Smart IOLs are expensive, irreversible, and carry a measurable complication profile. The decision to trade guaranteed optical quality for the possibility of spectacle independence is a legitimate patient preference, but only when the trade-off is presented honestly. The current marketing framework obscures this trade-off by positioning smart IOLs as categorically superior rather than as a convenience option with specific optical costs. The more recent marketing label “smart lenses” or “smart IOLs” represents an escalation of this deception: it implies adaptive, intelligent optical behavior that these passive devices simply do not possess. When “smart” is used to describe IOLs designed to make patients “all times and all distances glasses independent,” it crosses the boundary from commercial aspiration into clinical misrepresentation.

Furthermore, the claimed spectacle independence is frequently incomplete. While newer trifocal platforms have improved the range of functional vision, many patients still require reading glasses for prolonged near work, fine print, or low-contrast tasks. The 80% spectacle independence rate reported across meta-analyses means that one in five patients pays the smart surcharge and still needs glasses, while simultaneously bearing the optical penalties of multifocal design that a monofocal patient would have avoided entirely.

Figure 5 below illustrates the smart IOL decision cascade, from marketing encounter to patient outcome, visually.




Figure 5. The Smart IOL Decision Cascade illustrates the pathway from initial marketing encounter through financial incentives, consent process, implantation, and eventual patient outcomes, including the dissatisfaction-to-explanation cascade affecting a clinically significant minority.

9. Recommendations for Evidence-Based Reform

Based on the evidence reviewed, we propose the following reforms to current smart IOL practice:

First, regulatory bodies should require that manufacturer-funded clinical trials report contrast sensitivity data as a primary outcome measure, alongside a standardized dysphotopsia assessment. Currently, these metrics are reported inconsistently or relegated to secondary endpoints, allowing the most clinically relevant adverse effects of multifocal optics to be systematically de-emphasized.

Second, the informed consent process for smart IOL implantation should be standardized to include explicit quantitative disclosure of the contrast sensitivity reduction and dysphotopsia rates documented in the Cochrane review and independent outcome studies, not merely the favorable figures from manufacturer-sponsored trials.

Third, the term “smart” should be retired from clinical and regulatory usage in favor of descriptive terminology that accurately characterizes the optical properties of the device. “Multifocal,” and “extended depth of focus,” are clinically descriptive; “smart” is commercially descriptive and should have no place in medical decision-making.

Fourth, independent post-market surveillance registries should be established to track smart IOL outcomes, including patient-reported quality of vision, explantation rates, and neuroadaptation failure, over a minimum follow-up of 24 months. The current reliance on 3 to 6-month follow-up from sponsored trials is inadequate to capture the full spectrum of adverse outcomes.

Fifth, financial disclosure requirements for smart IOL counseling should be implemented, analogous to the disclosures required in financial advisory relationships, so that patients are aware of the economic incentives that may influence their surgeon’s recommendations.

10. Limitations

This review has several limitations that should be considered when interpreting its conclusions. First, as a critical narrative review undertaken with an explicit evaluative thesis, it is subject to potential confirmatory selection bias toward evidence that supports the critical view. This risk is mitigated by anchoring clinical claims to the highest available level of evidence; the Cochrane systematic review (de Silva et al., 2016), and by corroborating each major claim with multiple independent sources of different study types; however, readers should remain aware that a formal systematic review with pre-specified search criteria and risk-of-bias assessment would provide stronger protection against selective evidence use. Second, the absence of a fully pre-registered search protocol means that some relevant literature may have been missed, particularly studies published in non-English languages, conference proceedings, or grey literature sources not indexed in the databases searched; this is especially pertinent for newer EDOF platform outcome data. Third, the “independent” adverse event data presented throughout this review derives primarily from tertiary referral centers that specifically receive dissatisfied patients; a population selected for adverse outcomes. These data therefore over-represent the complication end of the spectrum in precisely the same way that manufacturer-sponsored data under-represent it; the true real-world adverse event prevalence in an unselected cataract population lies somewhere between these two poles. Fourth, the paper’s critique applies most directly to diffractive multifocal IOLs, whose simultaneous-vision optical architecture is the basis for the contrast sensitivity penalty and dysphotopsia arguments. Extended depth-of-focus (EDOF) lenses operate on different optical principles; primarily elongation of the focal range rather than discrete focal splitting, and evidence suggests their photic phenomenon rates and contrast sensitivity penalties may differ in degree from those of trifocal diffractive designs; conclusions regarding dysphotopsia and contrast sensitivity should therefore be applied to EDOF platforms with appropriate qualification. Fifth, the medicolegal and market data cited rely in part on commercial reports and trade publications rather than peer-reviewed primary sources; while these are the best available data for those domains, they carry the limitations inherent to non-peer-reviewed material.

10.1 Key Assumptions

This review rests on four explicit methodological assumptions that readers should evaluate independently. First, it is assumed that manufacturer-sponsored clinical trials systematically over-represent favorable outcomes relative to real-world performance, as a consequence of strict inclusion criteria, short follow-up periods, and outcome measure selection; this assumption is treated as empirically supported by the Cochrane review findings and the tertiary-referral data, but it is nonetheless an assumption that frames the entire analysis. Second, it is assumed that independent tertiary-referral data, despite over-representing dissatisfied patients, provides a more accurate signal of the range and severity of adverse outcomes than sponsored trial data, because unselected adverse outcomes are less subject to design-induced suppression; readers who contest this hierarchy of evidence will reach different conclusions. Third, neuroadaptation is treated as a dichotomous outcome; either adequate adaptation occurs or it does not, rather than as a continuous spectrum; this simplification is clinically standard (the “wait 6–12 months” threshold reflects this dichotomy in practice) but may understate the burden of partial adaptation. Fourth, it is assumed that the commercial incentive structure described in Section 5 influences clinical recommendations at a population level; while direct empirical data on the relationship between surgeon financial incentives and smart IOL recommendation rates are limited, this assumption is consistent with a large body of evidence on industry-physician financial relationships in other medical device contexts.

11. Conclusions

The smart intraocular lens industry has constructed a narrative of unqualified progress that is not fully supported by the clinical evidence. While some patients unquestionably benefit from the extended range of vision provided by multifocal and EDOF platforms, the industry’s marketing and the literature it generates systematically understate the prevalence and severity of adverse effects, overstate the reliability of neuroadaptation, and conflate technological sophistication with clinical superiority.

The evidence reviewed in this paper supports several conclusions. First, every smart IOL that operates through simultaneous vision imposes a measurable optical penalty; reduced contrast sensitivity and increased dysphotopsia, that is not a complication but a design feature. Second, neuroadaptation failure is not a rare anomaly but a foreseeable consequence of implanting devices whose neural demands exceed some patients’ cortical capacity. Third, the commercial structure of smart IOL surgery creates incentives that compromise the objectivity of physician counseling and the quality of informed consent. Fourth, the evidence base upon which smart IOLs are marketed is dominated by manufacturer-sponsored research with selection bias that inflates apparent efficacy and underestimates real-world complication rates. The practical consequence of these four findings is direct and measurable: patients who receive smart IOLs based on industry-dominated evidence and commercially shaped consent processes are making irreversible surgical decisions without adequate knowledge of the optical penalties, the neuroadaptation risks, or the financial incentives acting on their surgeon. When that knowledge gap results in neuroadaptation failure, explantation surgery, or permanent dysphotopsia, the harm is traceable to the evidentiary distortion documented throughout this review.

None of this argues that smart IOLs should be withdrawn from clinical use. It argues, rather, that the current presentation of these devices to patients and the medical community is misleadingly optimistic, that the adverse effect profile is inadequately disclosed, and that the “smart” label functions as marketing rather than as a reliable clinical indicator. Patients deserve to make their IOL selection based on honest, balanced information; including the reality that, for many, a monofocal IOL with a \$2 pair of reading glasses would have delivered superior visual quality at every focal distance except near, without the risk of neuroadaptation failure, explantation surgery, or permanent dysphotopsia. Until the smart IOL industry embraces this level of transparency, the “smart” in its branding will remain a reflection of price rather than of patient benefit. In essence, there is no such thing as a “smart IOL” per se. An IOL earns that designation only retrospectively, when it is matched to the correct patient; whether a monofocal spherical lens, a monofocal toric lens, a multifocal or trifocal lens, or an EDOF lens, and that patient achieves the best possible visual outcome from the implant. The intelligence lies not in the device but in the clinical judgment required to select it.

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